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1A Fallible ‘Fail-Safe’
Executive Summary
The 2000 presidential election highlighted many of the problems plaguing the nation’s 
election administration system. In response, Congress passed the Help America Vote 
Act of 2002 (HAVA), in which nationwide provisional balloting was established to en-
sure that no eligible voter is turned away from the polls on Election Day. HAVA requires 
states to offer “fail-safe” provisional ballots to all voters who believe they are registered 
but whose names do not appear on the voter rolls or who cannot meet voter identifica-
tion requirements. Such ballots are counted if election officials are subsequently able to 
determine that the individual was a legitimate voter under state law.  
When states adopt fair standards for the casting and counting of provisional ballots and 
the standards are properly implemented, provisional ballots can be an effective mecha-
nism to enfranchise voters. Indeed, in the 2004 election, an additional 1 million vot-
ers were able to vote—and have their vote counted—because of provisional balloting. 
However, when states adopt unnecessarily stringent standards for counting provisional 
ballots and poll workers are not adequately trained on provisional balloting procedures, 
“fail-safe” ballots can and will fail.   
While comprehensive data on the casting and counting of provisional ballots in 2006 
is not yet available, A Fallible ‘Fail-Safe’ documents problems with provisional ballots 
experienced by voters as they attempted to vote in the November 2006 election.  Based 
on extensive examination of data captured in the Election Incident Reporting System 
by volunteers with the Election Protection Coalition, we found administrative failures, 
instances of inadequate poll worker training, and problems with the accuracy of voter 
rolls in states across the nation. 
A Fallible ‘Fail-safe’ provides a snapshot of provisional balloting problems experienced by 
voters across the nation in November 2006:   
Over one-third of problems involved voters either being denied a provisional bal-
lot when they were likely entitled to one, or individuals being required to cast a 
provisional ballot when they should have voted with a regular ballot. 
Almost 40 percent of the incidents involved problems with voter registration 
lists—often causing numerous voters to be omitted from the rolls at their polling 
place and leading to voter and administrator confusion about provisional ballot 
use—and other breakdowns in election administration occurring prior to Elec-
tion Day.   
Fourteen percent of reports involved provisional ballots and electronic voting 
machine malfunctions.   
Fifteen percent of incidents involved poll workers either requiring voters to cast 
provisional ballots even though they had provided proper ID, requesting ID un-
necessarily or, in the case of voters who genuinely lacked the appropriate ID, fail-
ing to inform such voters of the necessary steps to validate their provisional bal-
lots (e.g., presenting valid ID to elections officials within a prescribed number of 
days after the election). Almost 80 percent of these incidents happened in Ohio.
▷
▷
▷
▷
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Other problems encountered by voters include voters casting provisional ballots that 
were almost certainly rejected because they were cast in the wrong precinct or because 
of clerical errors, such as not signing the provisional ballot envelope, and problems with 
absentee ballots leading to confusion in the administration of provisional ballots.  
A Fallible ‘Fail-Safe’ illustrates the ongoing problems in the administration of provi-
sional ballots.  Two election cycles after the implementation of HAVA, poll workers are 
still confused about the federal provisional balloting requirement and voter lists are still 
riddled with errors.  To remedy these problems, Congress and the states should take 
clear steps outlined in the recommendations of this report—administrative and training 
reforms, passing Election Day Registration—that can ensure that all eligible voters are 
able to cast a ballot and have that ballot counted, in the 2008 election and beyond.
3A Fallible ‘Fail-Safe’
Introduction 
Following the widespread problems of the 2000 presidential election, numerous election 
reforms have been proposed, debated, and enacted in Congress and states across the 
country. Provisional balloting was one such reform, implemented as part of the federal 
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). To ensure that no voter is turned away from 
the polls on Election Day, Congress included in HAVA a so-called “fail-safe” voting pro-
vision, requiring states to offer provisional ballots to individuals who believe they are 
registered to vote but whose names do not appear on the voter rolls or whose eligibility is 
challenged. This provision is also extended to those who do not meet federal identifica-
tion requirements. Such ballots are counted if election officials subsequently determine 
that the individual was a legitimate voter under state law.1
Provisional balloting can and does work in states that have adopted fair standards for 
the casting and counting of these ballots. Indeed, in the 2004 presidential election an 
additional 1 million voters were able to vote—and have their votes counted—because of 
provisional balloting. Yet, provisional ballots can fall short of their promise when states 
adopt restrictive standards and poll workers are not adequately trained.   
Clear and consistent state standards for handling provisional ballots become even more 
important in closely-contested elections. While provisional ballots may compose only a 
fraction of the national vote, they determined the outcome of various electoral races in 
2006. For example:
Thirty-nine provisional ballots were rejected in Nebraska’s 12th State Senate Dis-
trict election where Steve Lathrop beat Jean Stothert by 14 votes.2   
The candidates for County Commissioner in Brooks County, Georgia, were 
locked in a 318-318 vote tie on election night, and provisional ballots played a 
decisive role in the outcome.3
In South River, New Jersey, Councilman Anthony Razzano beat his opponent 
by one vote, shifting power in the Borough Council away from Democrats to an 
even split between Democrats and Republicans. Nine provisional ballots were 
rejected in that race.4
Comprehensive data on the casting and counting of provisional ballots in the 2006 elec-
tion is not yet available.5 This report provides a snapshot of provisional balloting prob-
lems experienced by voters across the nation in November 2006. The goal of this report 
is to highlight the recurring need to reform provisional balloting implementation and 
other election administration procedures so that no voter is wrongfully disfranchised in 
2008 and future elections. 
▷
▷
▷
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Provisional Ballot History
Millions of citizens were denied their right to vote in the 2000 presidential election. It 
has been estimated that between 1.5 and 3 million votes were lost in the 2000 election 
because of registration problems alone.6 Defective voter lists were the source of many of 
these problems.  
Provisional balloting was part of the response to the mass disfranchisement of the 2000 
election. While HAVA expanded the use of provisional balloting to all states without 
Election Day Registration, the concept itself was not new. Twenty-six states had allowed 
for some form of provisional balloting prior to 2002.7   
While HAVA requires that provisional ballots be offered to all those whose names are 
not on the registration lists, the details of implementation are left to the states. Regret-
tably, many states used the discretion afforded them to adopt unnecessarily stringent 
requirements for deciding when a provisional ballot will be counted. What Congress 
had characterized as a “fail-safe” voting procedure fell short of expectations in the 2004 
election. While provisional ballots enfranchised many voters, over one in three of the 
nearly 2 million provisional ballots cast were not counted. Thirteen states each rejected 
over 10,000 provisional ballots; 23 states each counted less than 50 percent of provisional 
ballots.8 As this report demonstrates, many of the provisional balloting problems docu-
mented in 2004 occurred again in the 2006 general election.9    
Methodology 
This report is based on data collected by the Election Protection Coalition, the nation’s 
largest non-profit, non-partisan voter protection initiative, led by the Lawyers’ Commit-
tee for Civil Rights Under Law, the NAACP, the National Bar Association, and the People 
for the American Way Foundation. Formed in response to the widespread disfranchise-
ment witnessed in the 2000 election, Election Protection works to ensure that all eligible 
voters have the opportunity to participate in the political process.  
Over 2,000 volunteers from more than 50 non-profit organizations and nearly three dozen 
of the nation’s largest law firms participated in Election Protection activities in November 
2006. Volunteers in 14 call centers across 19 states staffed a national toll-free hotline for 
voters to report election problems. An innovative, web-based software application—the 
Election Incident Reporting System (EIRS)—was used to categorize and record those in-
cidents. Over 20,000 calls were received through the hotline on November 6 and 7, 2006; 
17,705 of these callers were connected to an Election Protection volunteer.10  
Dēmos analyzed 520 EIRS provisional balloting incident reports. Of these, 450 described 
actual problems.11 This report is based on a review of those incidents, supplemented by 
media reports. It is important to note that the majority of incidents were self-reported to 
a national toll-free hotline. Where possible, Dēmos contacted county elections officials 
and asked that they provide additional information and insights on the reported incidents. 
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While this analysis does not represent a definitive account of problems experienced by 
voters in November 2006, it does identify ongoing problems with the administration of 
provisional balloting and highlights the need for further improvement. 
Overview Of results
The provisional balloting incidents recorded by Election Protection hotline volunteers 
are cause for national concern. Many voter registration lists in use on Election Day 2006 
were riddled with errors while poll workers and election officials were often confused 
about the proper application of provisional ballots two election cycles after HAVA went 
into effect. Provisional balloting problems broke down along the following lines.
Over one-third of problems involved voters being denied a provisional ballot when 
they were likely entitled to one, or individuals being required to cast a provisional 
ballot when they should have voted with a regular ballot. 
Almost 40 percent of the incidents involved problems with voter lists and other 
breakdowns in election administration occurring prior to Election Day.
Fourteen percent of reports involved provisional ballots and electronic voting ma-
chine malfunctions.
Fifteen percent of incidents involved poll workers either requiring voters to cast 
provisional ballots even though they had provided proper ID, requesting ID unnec-
essarily, or, in the case of voters who genuinely lacked the appropriate ID, failing to 
inform such voters of the necessary steps to validate their provisional ballots (e.g., 
presenting valid ID to elections officials within a prescribed number of days after 
the election). Almost 80 percent of these incidents happened in Ohio.
Provisional Ballot Problems
To illustrate the types of provisional balloting problems expierenced by voters in the 
2006 election, Dēmos has codified the EIRS incident reports captured by Election 
Protection volunteers using seven main themes.
1:  No provisional ballot was offered, or voter was refused a provisional ballot.
Almost one-quarter of incidents involved reports of poll workers failing or refusing to 
offer provisional ballots to voters who believed that they were eligible to vote. While the 
rules used to count provisional ballots may vary by state and may be interpreted differ-
ently from county to county,12 federal law requires that a provisional ballot be provided 
▷
▷
▷
▷
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with errors while poll workers and election officials were often confused 
about the proper application of provisional ballots two election cycles 
after HAVA went into effect.
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to all voters whose names do not appear on the voter rolls or who cannot present proper 
identification.13 Election Protection not only received reports of poll workers failing to 
offer or refusing to provide provisional ballots, it also received a dozen reports of polling 
places without any provisional ballots on site.
Among the incidents reported to the Election Protection hotline:
A husband and wife in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, claimed to have informed elec-
tion officials of their address change in advance of Election Day, but only the 
husband’s name appeared on the rolls when they arrived at their polling site. The 
wife reported being denied a provisional ballot by poll workers.  
A Jackson County, Missouri, voter had moved into the county and submitted a 
voter registration form several months prior to the election. She called the day 
before the election to confirm her registration and was told she could vote if she 
brought proper ID to the polling place. Despite these steps, the voter’s name was 
not on the rolls at her polling place and she was not permitted to vote, not even 
by provisional ballot.
A voter in Hamilton County, Ohio, went to her usual polling place to discover 
that her name was missing from the voter list. She was told by poll workers that 
she could vote provisionally but that no provisional ballots were available. The 
voter was directed to another polling place where she was refused a provisional 
ballot.
At the Woodland United Presbyterian Church in Duval County, Florida, a voter 
whose wife was on the rolls was told to go to another polling place. When poll 
workers learned that the voter had called the Election Protection hotline for as-
sistance, he reported being locked out of the polling place and prevented from 
voting.
A voter in Shelby County, Tennessee, moved to a new address and updated her 
voter registration information prior to Election Day only to find her name absent 
from the voter rolls. The poll worker did not call the county election commission 
to check the voter’s registration status and did not offer the voter a provisional 
ballot.
News accounts and blog posts substantiated the misapplication of provisional balloting 
requirements by inadequately trained poll workers. Ron Rivest of the CalTech/MIT Vot-
ing Technology Project reported that poll workers in Cobb County, Georgia, had uni-
formly failed to offer provisional ballots to voters on Election Day. Rivest was told that 
voters whose names were not on the rolls could not vote, even by provisional ballot. One 
sympathetic poll manager regretfully admitted that he had turned away 10 voters by 
10:00 am.14
The Hartford Courant reported that 150 University of Connecticut students in Mans-
field, Connecticut, were left off the voter rolls on Election Day despite claiming to have 
pre-registered. Only one-third to one-half of the students cast provisional ballots.15 One 
student reported being initially turned away from the polls after her name did not ap-
pear on the list. Upon realizing she could vote provisionally, the student returned to the 
polling place only to encounter poll workers unfamiliar with the provisional balloting 
process.16 The perseverant voter was eventually given a provisional ballot by a polling 
place moderator.
▷
▷
▷
▷
▷
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Comprehensive data on the number of voters turned away from the polls on Election 
Day is not available. Likewise, the impact of those lost votes on election results is un-
known. What is clear is that the reliability of HAVA’s “fail-safe” voting provision remains 
in doubt. 
2:  voters eligible for a regular ballot were required to vote by provisional 
ballot.
Multiple incidents involved confused poll workers re-
quiring voters eligible to vote by regular ballot to vote 
provisionally instead. In fact, observers have indicated 
a trend whereby provisional ballots are increasingly 
being used as “ballots of convenience” by inadequately 
trained poll workers or those looking for a quick fix to 
Election Day problems.17 Vague and inconsistent stan-
dards adopted by the states for counting provisional 
ballots increase the likelihood such ballots will be 
rejected.18 The use of provisional ballots for purposes 
other than those prescribed by HAVA thus unnecessar-
ily jeopardizes the votes of eligible citizens. 
Election Protection incident reports suggest that provisional ballots were inappropriately 
used in states across the country.
A caller reported that long lines at the Cochran Avenue Baptist Church poll site 
in Los Angeles County, California, prompted poll workers to distribute provi-
sional ballots to all voters.  
According to a caller, a polling place in San Francisco, California, closed 15 min-
utes early and moved the polling station out to the sidewalk where provisional 
ballots were issued to everyone arriving to vote.
Calls from both Duval County, Florida, and New York City reported that voters 
who moved to a new address within the same precinct were required to cast 
provisional ballots. The laws of both states allow voters moving within the same 
precinct to update their addresses at the polling place and cast regular ballots.19 
A voter in Hudson County, New Jersey, reported being required to cast a provi-
sional ballot even after a phone call to the board of elections verified the voter 
was indeed registered.
There were a disproportionate number of reports concerning improperly-issued provi-
sional ballots in Ohio. Directives issued by then-Secretary of State J. Kenneth Blackwell, 
and a lawsuit filed in the weeks leading up to Election Day, created significant confusion 
among poll workers and voters as to what constituted proper ID at the polls. The parties 
agreed to a consent order on November 1, 2006, that specified that a valid driver’s license 
would be accepted as proper ID, even if the license bore an old address.20 Despite this 
agreement, voters who arrived at the polls with a driver’s license bearing an old address 
were instructed to vote by provisional ballot. Forty-five such incidents were reported to 
the Election Protection hotline.  
▷
▷
▷
▷
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3:  voter list problems interfered with voting.
Inaccurate voter registration lists continue to plague elections. In 40 percent of Election 
Protection calls, voters complained they had been omitted from the voter rolls despite 
having registered before Election Day or had been improperly designated on the voter 
rolls as having to cast a provisional ballot. State implementation of new federal voter 
registration procedures likely contributed to these problems. Under HAVA, the identity 
of newly registered voters must be confirmed by matching information recorded on voter 
registration applications with government records. As with provisional balloting, states 
were given discretion in crafting information-matching policies and procedures. Some 
states adopted model policies while others issued standards making it more difficult for 
eligible voters to get on the voter rolls. Thirteen21 of the 25 states from which list problems 
were reported use a list matching process that can create a significant, high, or very high 
risk of voting list error.22 Seventy-eight incidents were reported from these 13 states.  
Among the problems reported on Election Day: 
A voter in Maricopa County, Arizona, reported that despite having confirmed 
her registration status and polling place location with the county recorder the 
day before the election, her name was left off the rolls at her polling place.
A voter in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, claimed to have been directed to five dif-
ferent polling places before she was issued a provisional ballot. The voter’s name 
was not found on any of the voting lists at any of the polling places.  
A voter in Franklin County, Ohio, who had cast ballots in the 2005 general elec-
tion and the 2006 primary found his name missing from the rolls at his polling 
place. A poll worker informed him that a confirmation letter sent to his home was 
returned as undeliverable. The voter had neither received the letter nor moved to 
a new address. 
A Beckley, West Virginia, resident went to the precinct listed on her voter regis-
tration card only to find that her name was not on the voter rolls, even though she 
had voted there in the past. She was referred to the precinct next door; again she 
was not found on the list. The voter was told by a poll worker that she could vote 
with a provisional ballot, but that it would not count. She left without voting.
If recent experience is any indication, a sizeable percentage of these provisional ballots 
were likely rejected despite voters taking all appropriate steps to ensure that they were 
registered to vote.23  
4:  Absentee ballot problems and appropriate use of provisional ballots.
Absentee ballots are provided to voters unable to vote in person on Election Day or, if 
permitted under state law, voters who prefer to vote by mail. Absentee ballots may be 
the only recourse for elderly or disabled citizens or those traveling out of town. Absentee 
ballots are typically mailed to voters’ residences in advance of elections to be completed 
and returned on or before Election Day. That process can often break down. Some vot-
ers never receive their absentee ballots or receive them too late for timely submission. 
In such incidents, the absentee balloter’s only option may be to go to the polls and cast 
a provisional ballot, if permitted under state law. In other cases, voters never request an 
▷
▷
▷
▷
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absentee ballot, but are mistakenly designated on the voter list as having made such a 
request. HAVA’s provisional balloting stipulations do not specifically address absentee 
balloting problems.  
Election Protection volunteers fielded 29 calls about absentee ballot problems. Seventeen 
voters reported being marked in the poll books as having requested an absentee ballot, 
when in fact they had not. With no way of disproving such requests, these voters were 
forced to cast a provisional ballot. Twelve calls were received from voters who had re-
quested absentee ballots that never arrived. In most cases, they had to travel to their poll-
ing place to vote provisionally. As discussed earlier, vague and inconsistent standards for 
counting provisional ballots may unnecessarily place an otherwise valid vote at risk. Fur-
thermore, many voters request absentee ballots due to sickness or a disability, or because 
they are out of town on Election Day. Requiring absentee voters to travel to their polling 
place to cast a provisional ballot runs counter to the purpose of absentee balloting.  
Examples of absentee ballot problems from the Election Protection EIRS database:
A disabled voter in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, claimed she had requested an ab-
sentee ballot four times prior to the election, with no response. She was forced to 
travel to a polling place on Election Day and voted provisionally.
A Los Angeles County, California, voter requested an absentee ballot that she 
received but misplaced. Having traveled to the polling place, the voter was not 
offered a provisional ballot and left without voting. Under California law, a voter 
in this situation should have been offered a provisional ballot to be counted once 
election officials confirmed her absentee ballot was not returned.  
5:  improperly administered provisional ballots 
disenfranchise voters.
Provisional ballots are liable to be ruled invalid if voters 
are not properly instructed on how to complete them. The 
misapplication of provisional balloting rules and proce-
dures by inadequately trained or confused poll workers in 
November 2006 likely cost many individuals their votes. 
Forty-two provisional ballots in Boulder County, Colo-
rado, did not bear the voters’ signatures and were presumably rejected.24 Students at the 
University of Colorado registering for the first time were not informed that they had to 
present ID in order to vote. At the polling place, election judges offered them two op-
tions: obtain and present documents from the University that would substantiate their 
identity and vote a regular ballot, or cast a provisional ballot. The election judges failed 
to make clear that these provisional ballots would not be counted.25 Unlike other states, 
Colorado does not allow provisional voters who have not shown ID to substantiate their 
identity—and save their vote—by returning to the elections office within a prescribed 
number of days with appropriate ID.26
▷
▷
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Other incidents from the Election Protection database:
A voter at the Redwood School in Essex County, New Jersey, found that she was 
not on the rolls, despite voting in the last election. Although the poll worker prop-
erly provided her a provisional ballot, the voter was told she must vote for candi-
dates belonging to the same party. Ironically, a challenger at the polling place had 
to inform the voter that she could vote for the candidates of her choice.
Callers in Hudson County, New Jersey, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and Harford 
County, Maryland, complained that their provisional ballots were not placed in 
sealed envelopes, exposing them to tampering or getting lost. A Hudson County 
caller reported that she never signed an affidavit attesting to her eligibility to 
vote. The unsigned affidavit likely invalidated the provisional vote.
6:  Jurisdictional restrictions often void provisional ballots. 
Eligible voters whose names are not on the voter list or do not have the necessary ID are 
permitted by law to cast a provisional ballot. However, at least 30 states and the District 
of Columbia did not count provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct, even if the in-
dividual voted in the county where she registered.27 When multiple precincts are located 
in the same polling place, an error as simple as getting in the wrong line can cost a citizen 
her vote. 
Some examples of jurisdictional problems captured by Election Protection volunteers:
A voter in Franklin County, Ohio, was never notified that her polling place had 
been relocated. The poll worker at her old poll site directed the voter to cast a 
provisional ballot. She apparently failed to inform the voter that Ohio rejects 
provisional votes cast at the wrong precinct. 
A Texas Precinct Chair called the Election Protection hotline to voice her concern 
that confused voters might cast ballots that were sure to be discounted. Voters 
in the county had historically been able to vote outside of their home precinct. 
In November 2006, however, voters were directed to go to their correct polling 
place or cast a provisional ballot at the polling place at which they appeared. Un-
fortunately, Texas invalidates any provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct.
7:  voting machine problems and provisional ballots. 
The introduction of new voting machines over the last several years has led to widespread 
disruptions of federal, state and local elections. Indeed, scores of voting machine prob-
lems affected various aspects of election administration in November 2006.28 
Fourteen percent of incidents reported to the Election Protection hotline were related to 
electronic voting machines and provisional ballots.29 Several dozen reports involved the 
use of provisional ballots when all or most of the electronic voting machines at a polling 
place were not properly working. Forty callers reported being issued provisional ballots 
after they were prohibited from casting a regular ballot due to malfunctioning electronic 
voting machines. Twelve callers were turned away from the polls or made to wait until 
the machines could be repaired. While state law varies on the use of emergency paper or 
provisional ballots in these situations, provisional ballots were inappropriately used in at 
▷
▷
▷
▷
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least nine reported incidents. These nine incidents occurred in New York and New Jer-
sey, states that both call for emergency paper ballots when voting machines break down. 
Emergency paper ballots are superior to provisional ballots in the instance of machine 
malfunction since they are treated as regular ballots cast by voters whose eligibility has 
already been determined and is not subject to challenge.  
Some examples of machine-related problems reported to the Election Protection hot-
line:
Half of the voting machines at the Dover Bible Church in Tuscarawas County, 
Ohio, were not working on Election Day. A caller reported that poll workers were 
directing voters unable to stand in the long line to cast provisional ballots at the 
board of elections office.
Several voters from Essex County, New Jersey, called to report that voting ma-
chines were down and voters were given provisional ballots rather than the emer-
gency paper ballots required under New Jersey state law.
A poll worker from Richland County, South Carolina, called to report that voting 
machines were not working when she opened the polling place in the morning. 
She handed out “fail-safe” provisional ballots until the machines were fixed. The 
poll worker called the Election Protection hotline to ask if these ballots would be 
counted, a troubling indication of inadequate training.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Dēmos’ analysis of incidents reported to the Election Protection hotline in November 
2006 shows ongoing problems in the administration of provisional ballots. Poll workers 
are confused about federal provisional balloting requirements, forcing otherwise eligible 
voters to cast provisional ballots or using them as a panacea for voting machine malfunc-
tion and other Election Day mishaps. Voters are at times 
issued provisional ballots that are sure to be discounted 
thereafter.
The data also suggests continuing challenges in produc-
ing accurate voter lists for Election Day. Unacceptably 
high numbers of voters are forced to vote provisionally 
when election officials lose or fail to process voter reg-
istration applications and change of address notices, or 
when the names of duly registered voters are otherwise 
omitted from the voter rolls. Any instance where the op-
portunity to cast a regular vote is lost can jeopardize a citizen’s most fundamental right 
to meaningfully participate in the democratic process.
Voter complaints logged by Election Protection volunteers show that the current admin-
istration of provisional balloting does not meet the needs of many eligible voters. Further 
reform is necessary. Dēmos recommends the following policy changes to ensure that 
every eligible voter is able to cast a meaningful ballot on Election Day.
▷
▷
▷
Congress should put an end to “placebo 
ballots” by setting voter-protective 
standards that provide provisional voters 
with clear instructions and adequate time 
to verify their eligibility.
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imprOve pOll wOrker trAiNiNg
Reports made to the Election Protection hotline indicate that poll workers across the na-
tion continue to be confused about the proper use of provisional ballots. In many cases, 
voters were never informed of the opportunity to cast a provisional ballot or were flatly 
refused the right to do so. Others were given provisional ballots when they were likely 
entitled to vote by regular ballot. States and localities must ensure that all poll workers 
are fully trained in provisional balloting procedures. 
Improving poll worker performance will require additional federal, state, and local funds. 
The Count Every Vote Act (CEVA) introduced in the 110th Congress by Sen. Hillary Rod-
ham Clinton and Rep. Stephanie Tubbs-Jones would authorize new federal spending to 
help states train poll workers on the appropriate use of provisional ballots, the process for 
casting such ballots, and other election procedures. The CEVA also calls for a study on 
appropriate methods to recruit high school students to serve as poll workers.30
require emergeNcy pAper bAllOts
When voting machines malfunction, emergency paper ballots should be provided to vot-
ers. Such ballots should automatically be counted as would a regular ballot. Bills intro-
duced by Rep. Rush Holt,31 Sen. Dianne Feinstein,32 and Sen. Hillary Rodham and Rep. 
Stephanie Tubbs-Jones in the 110th Congress require that states issue emergency paper 
ballots where electronic voting machines malfunction.33 These proposals preserve the 
intent of provisional ballots as a ballot of last resort, not to be used when a voter is eligible 
to vote with a regular ballot. 
imprOve vOter registrAtiON list mAiNteNANce ANd dAtA-
mAtchiNg stANdArds
EIRS reports indicate that a significant number of voters who believed that they were 
duly registered to vote were omitted from the rolls on Election Day in 2006. Legislation 
introduced by Sen. Feinstein would ensure that no otherwise eligible voter is prevented 
from being added to the rolls because of errors or inconsistencies in data or variations in 
name, such as maiden names, nicknames, or middle names.34 Absent federal action, as 
states implement their HAVA-mandated computerized, statewide voter registration da-
tabases we recommend that they adopt data-matching standards that minimize the risks 
of typographical error and other data entry flaws that keep eligible voters off the rolls. 
Nebraska, New Jersey and Oregon have been cited as states whose database standards 
help to ensure that all eligible voters are able to cast a ballot.35 
clArify AbseNtee/prOvisiONAl bAllOtiNg rules
As discussed above, HAVA’s provisional ballot requirement does not address the issue 
of a voter whose absentee ballot did not arrive prior to Election Day. Some states allow a 
voter who has requested but not received an absentee ballot to cast a provisional ballot at 
the polling place. Others offer no such contingency.36 HAVA should be amended to allow 
for provisional voting at the polls for individuals who have requested but not received 
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absentee ballots before Election Day. These provisional ballots should be counted once 
election officials confirm that the absentee ballots were never cast. 
cOuNt prOvisiONAl bAllOts cAst iN the cOrrect cOuNty
States are divided on whether to count a provisional ballot cast in the wrong precinct. At 
least 30 states and the District of Columbia rejected such votes in the November 2006 
election. An error as simple as getting in the wrong line at a polling place could cost an 
eligible citizen her vote. HAVA should be amended to clarify that provisional votes must 
be counted for all races in which the voter is eligible, even if the ballot was cast in the 
wrong precinct. Three pieces of federal legislation seek to correct this problem.37 Should 
Congress fail to act on this issue, responsibility falls to the states to pass legislation to 
ensure ballots cast outside the voter’s precinct are counted. Utah recently passed legisla-
tion requiring provisional ballots to be counted if cast anywhere in the state, providing 
other eligibility requirements are met.38 State legislatures in Indiana, South Carolina, 
Texas, Rhode Island and New York introduced bills in 2006 that would require counting 
such ballots.
prOvide cleAr stANdArds fOr vOter ideNtificAtiON ANd 
vAlidAtiON Of bAllOts
While HAVA sets minimum identification requirements for first-time voters registering 
by mail and provides for provisional voting by individuals who cannot meet the require-
ments, it does not prescribe how states later process such provisional ballots. As a result, 
Colorado must offer provisional ballots to newly registered voters without proper ID, 
but it is free to later discount all such votes as invalid. Other states allow individuals to 
validate their provisional votes after Election Day by presenting acceptable ID to elec-
tion officials. Congress should put an end to “placebo ballots” by setting voter-protective 
standards that provide provisional voters with clear instructions and adequate time to 
verify their eligibility.
pAss electiON dAy registrAtiON (edr) iNtO lAw
Ultimately, states should embrace Election Day Registration (EDR), which provides a 
ready remedy to provisional balloting problems. With EDR, individuals whose names 
were left off the voter rolls can simply re-register and cast a valid ballot on Election Day. 
States with EDR report issuing very few provisional ballots in their elections39 and con-
sistently rank among the highest states in the nation in voter turnout.40 Seven states had 
EDR in the 2006 general election. Iowa enacted EDR in early 2007 and, most recently, 
North Carolina enacted a form of Same Day Registration in which voters can register and 
cast a ballot during periods of early voting.  
These basic reforms are a strong foundation for ensuring that no eligible voter is turned 
away from the polls and vote counts are as accurate as possible. Making provisional bal-
lots a true “fail-safe” will require some effort on the part of election officials and legisla-
tors. Voters should be able to fully expect that if they properly register to vote, their name 
will be on the voter list at the polls, and if they are asked to cast a provisional ballot in 
2008, that it will be properly counted. Americans deserve no less.
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